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The Future Is Today: Preparing the Legal
Ground for the United States Space Force
CLAYTON J. SCHMITT*
The Space Race officially launched on October 4, 1957, when
the Soviet Union placed Sputnik I, the first man-made satellite, into
Earth’s orbit. The United States fired back four months later, on
January 31, 1958, by launching its own satellite, Explorer I. While
both superpowers’ programs facially focused on scientific research,
each was funded and directed by their respective militaries. Military
functions in space followed shortly, with the United States beginning
to place its first reconnaissance satellites in space in 1959 as part
of the Corona program. American and Soviet discussions following
these initial military developments eventually led to the adoption of
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which severely restricted the types
of military activities the two powers could conduct either in orbit or
in the greater reaches of space. The United States has recently created a new military branch exclusively focused on space. This new
branch—the Space Force—will be greatly restricted by those early
treaties.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................564
I. INTERNATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN
SPACE ....................................................................................566
A. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 ......................................567
B. The Law of Armed Conflict and Other Restrictions .........570
1. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ....................................570
2. BROADER TREATY FRAMEWORK ..................................571
i. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 ......................572
*

J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, University of Miami School of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Christina Frohock for all of her help and mentorship, both on this paper and throughout law school. I would also like to thank my
parents, Tim and Laura Schmitt, for their limitless support and encouragement.
All opinions and errors are my own.
563

564

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:563

ii. The Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968 ...........572
iii. The Liability Convention of 1972 ..........................573
iv. The Registration Convention of 1975 ....................574
v. The Moon Agreement of 1979 ................................575
II. MODERN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND SPACE ........................576
A. Orbital Strike Capabilities ...............................................576
1. DEFINING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...............577
2. ORBITAL STRIKE WEAPONS ..........................................577
B. Anti-Ballistic Missile Defenses .........................................579
C. Anti-Satellite Warfare .......................................................580
D. General Military Activities ...............................................582
III. THE SPACE FORCE ..................................................................583
A. Structure of the New Branch ............................................583
B. Positive Impacts of Withdrawal........................................585
C. The Necessity of Space-Based Military Capabilities........586
IV. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OUTER SPACE TREATY ...................587
A. Treaty Enforcement ..........................................................587
B. The Process of Withdrawal ..............................................589
C. Repercussions of Withdrawal ...........................................591
1. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONCERNS ........................592
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPACE-BASED ARMS RACE .......595
CONCLUSION.................................................................................597
INTRODUCTION
The United States created a new military branch for the first time
in seventy-two years on December 20, 2019—the United States
Space Force (“Space Force”).1 Officially established as a sub-department of the United States Air Force (“Air Force”), the Space
Force has the potential to radically alter the United States’ military

1

United States Space Force Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081–83 (as enacted by the
President, Dec. 20, 2019). Title 10 of the United States Code was amended to
authorize the Space Force by the passage of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law by President Trump on Dec. 20, 2019.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, S.1790, 116th Cong.
(2019) (enacted).
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focus.2 The ultimate capabilities of this new force, however, are unsettled: this new branch can include powerful new warfighting abilities or instead merely amount to a reshuffling of already existing
military units and other Department of Defense organizations.
Under the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, better known as the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967 (“Outer Space Treaty”), certain military capabilities
are seriously restricted in space.3 Part I of this Note will discuss the
current legal restrictions on military activities, both from the Outer
Space Treaty and other sources of international law. Part II will
discuss modern military capabilities as they relate to those restrictions. Part III, then, will discuss the structure of the new Space
Force and what capabilities the branch could provide if the United
States were to withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. Part IV will
explore the legal methods of treaty enforcement and treaty withdrawal, as well as the possible legal and geopolitical repercussions
the United States must consider in balancing the decision to potentially withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. Finally, this Note
will conclude by confirming that if the Space Force is to truly be a
capable and coequal branch of the military, the United States must
withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty and commit to making this
new branch the home of unique military capabilities previously unrealized in any other branch of service. The United States will
likely have to fight an armed conflict in space4 and must be prepared for such a possibility. So long as the United States remains a
party to the Outer Space Treaty, however, the Space Force will not
be able to fully utilize the powerful new military capabilities that
space can offer.

2
Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, With the Stroke of a Pen, U.S.
Space Force Becomes a Reality, U.S. AIR FORCE (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2046061/with-the-stroke-of-apen-us-space-force-becomes-a-reality/.
3
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4
Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space,
10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK UNITED NATIONS L. 89, 125 (2006).
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I. INTERNATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN SPACE
This Part will provide an in-depth analysis of the international
legal restrictions on military action in space. It will begin with a brief
overview of the many different international agreements that govern
space. Next, it will examine each of the provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty that govern military actions and explore the extent of
the constraints they establish on military activity. Finally, it will
close with a discussion of other international law that affects military action in space, especially the Law of Armed Conflict
(“LOAC”).
While the Outer Space Treaty remains the single most impactful
international agreement on both military and other uses of space,
several other treaties and LOAC also play a role in limiting extraterrestrial military activity.5 The Outer Space Treaty itself covers a variety of topics, although it focuses primarily on two concerns: the
military use of space6 and national claims to possession of celestial
bodies (which it explicitly prohibits under Article II).7 The Articles
covering military use of space will be discussed in Section I.B, infra.
Commentators generally understand that many of the Outer Space
Treaty’s provisions are also addressed by other treaties relevant to
military activities in space, such as the Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space of 1968 (“Rescue and Return Agreement”).8 These Treaties will be discussed in Section I.C, infra, along
with LOAC and its effects on military actions in space.

5

Ryan Esparza, Event Horizon: Examining Military and Weaponization Issues in Space By Utilizing the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict,
83 J. AIR. L. & COM. 333, 339 (2018); Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the
Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 99–119 (2000) (listing various agreements that limit military activity in outer space).
6
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. IV, IX, X–XII.
7
Id. art. II.
8
See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]; see also Ramey,
supra note 5, at 87.
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A. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967
The Outer Space Treaty developed from the early space race between the United States and the Soviet Union,9 and its provisions
resemble a similar non-armament treaty: the Antarctic Treaty.10 The
United States and Soviet Union signed the Outer Space Treaty in
early 1967; it took effect later that same year.11 Today, 123 nations
are signatories to the Outer Space Treaty.12
The Outer Space Treaty’s primary restrictions on extraterrestrial
military activity come from Article IV.13 First, it prohibits any signatory nations from “plac[ing] in orbit around the earth any objects
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction.”14 It similarly prohibits nations from “instal[ling] such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station[ing] such weapons in outer
space in any other manner.”15 Article IV then forbids “establishment
of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing . . . of
weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies.”16 Article IV does, however, allow the participation of military
personnel in scientific research for “peaceful purposes” and “peaceful exploration” of celestial bodies.17 Nowhere does the Outer Space
Treaty define what it intends to mean by peaceful purposes or peaceful exploration.18 Article IV’s restrictions are short but impactful.

9

Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became
the Backbone for Space Law, VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:14 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines.
10
Compare The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered
into force June 23, 1961), with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3; see also Ramey,
supra note 5, at 106–08.
11
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
12
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280128cbd (last visited Dec.
27, 2019) [hereinafter UN Information Page on the Outer Space Treaty].
13
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See generally id.; see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 78–79.
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Many legal and military commentators have reflected on the restrictions the Article places on military actions in space.19 Specific
impacts will be discussed in Part II, infra, but suffice it to say simply
that both military action and emplacements in orbit and beyond
Earth are severely limited by the Outer Space Treaty.20
These restrictions are also significant in what they do not prevent: the placement or utilization of military forces or bases in deep
space or in orbit around other celestial bodies.21 Other commentators, however, have suggested that such activities are “implicitly
prohibited” by other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as well as
separate provisions of the United Nations Charter that regulate use
of force by nations.22 Curiously, such an analysis misses the fact that
prohibitions on use of force would not prevent the stationing of military forces or facilities in deep space or in orbit around other planets
or celestial bodies. However, such activities surely remain far in the
future and will be discussed minimally in this Note.
Articles IX through XII place different restrictions on military
activities in space: instead of explicitly prohibiting certain conduct,
they require affirmative disclosures of certain activities by the conducting nations.23 Article IX requires that states seek “consultations” with other parties to the Outer Space Treaty before conducting activities that could “cause potentially harmful interference with
activities of other [parties].”24 Article IX also allows nations party
to the treaty to request such consultations from other parties based

19
E.g., Esparza, supra note 5, at 341–42; Blair Stevenson Kuplic, The
Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race, 39
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1123, 1144–47 (2014); Christopher M. Petras,
“Space Force Alpha”: Military Use of the International Space Station and the
Concept of “Peaceful Purposes”, 53 AIR FORCE L. REV. 135, 157–61 (2002);
Ramey, supra note 5, at 78–85; Arjen Vermeer, A Legal Exploration of Force
Application in Outer Space, 46 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 299, 307–13 (2007); Rex
J. Zedalis & Catherine L. Wade, Note, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL. WESTERN INT’L L.J. 454, 459–61 (1978). Generally,
these reviews agree on the legality of most military activity in space under the
treaty, although some distinctions will be discussed in Part II, infra.
20
E.g., Esparza, supra note 5, at 341–42.
21
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
22
Ramey, supra note 5, at 82.
23
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. IX–XII.
24
Id. art. IX.
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on the “reason to believe” the other parties’ actions could create interference.25 Article X requires nations to “consider . . . any requests” made by other treaty parties to view the launch of any objects into space (although it does not actually require states to allow
the suggested observation).26 Article XI requires parties to inform
the United Nations (“UN”) and the public about any “activities in
outer space . . . to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.”27 Article XI even goes so far as to require the disclosure of “the nature,
conduct, locations and results of such activities.”28 Finally, Article
XII requires that any “stations, installations, equipment and space
vehicles . . . shall be open to representatives of other States Parties
to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.”29
These affirmative requirements do not outright restrict any allowable military activities, but they do require disclosures of personnel, materiel, installations, and actions to a degree that is incompatible with general military operations security.30 Military operations require some level of secrecy to function effectively.31 Once
an opponent knows what a military force is doing, where its personnel and weapons are emplaced, and what methods of attack and defense are available to it, that opponent can prepare for and avoid
much of that military force’s capabilities.32 For this reason, the disclosures required by Articles IX through XII effectively hamstring

25

Id.
Id. art. X.
27
Id. art. XI.
28
Id.
29
Id. art. XII.
30
See DEP’T OF DEF., UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF. FOR INTELLIGENCE, NO.
5205.02-M, DOD OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) MANUAL APP. 12 (2008),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Docments/DD/issuances/dodm/520502m.pdf
[hereinafter
OPSEC
MANUAL] (“The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control,
and protect critical information . . . Such information, if revealed to an adversary,
may prevent or degrade mission accomplishment, cause loss of life, or damage
friendly resources.”).
31
Id.
32
See id.
26
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any military operations in space by requiring a military force to violate the fundamental tenets of operational security.33 Therefore, Article IV is not the only component of the Outer Space Treaty with
serious implications for the Space Force.
B. The Law of Armed Conflict and Other Restrictions
The body of international law that makes up the Law of Armed
Conflict must be considered regarding military operations in
space.34 So, too, must other treaties on the conduct of nations in
space.35 Some of these treaties are duplicative of the Outer Space
Treaty, or expansive on topics touched upon in the Outer Space
Treaty, while a few others are largely separate.36 As elaborated below, each will impact operations of the Space Force, but none will
impose restrictions of a similar level as the Outer Space Treaty.
1. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The Law of Armed Conflict is a distinct body of international
law drawn from many international agreements and treaties.37 Functionally, it may be treated as two distinct concepts, although both are
considered to be components of LOAC: jus in bello; or, international
law regulating conduct of armed forces during the course of a war,
and jus ad bellum; or, international law defining the legality of initiating war.38 Regardless of the distinction, neither concept makes
an exception for military action based on the action’s location or
point of origination.39
There is no good reason to assume, then, that LOAC would not
apply to the use of weapons based in space or military actions that
occur in space.40 LOAC’s importance to an independent Space
33

Id.
Esparza, supra note 5, at 342; see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 28–63 (discussing the development of the Law of Armed Conflict as a distinct body of international law and evaluating restrictions placed on military forces).
35
Ramey, supra note 5, at 64–66.
36
See id. at 86, 89, 91, 96 (discussing the Rescue and Return Agreement,
Liability Convention, Registration Convention, and Moon Agreement as expansions of the Outer Space Treaty).
37
See id. at 28–63.
38
Id. at 32–34.
39
Esparza, supra note 5, at 342–43.
40
Id. at 343.
34
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Force is then both serious and not: as a branch of the armed forces,
any action conducted by the Space Force must comply with
LOAC.41 Any military capabilities added to the Space Force from
other branches would already have been compliant with LOAC, and
any new capabilities added would similarly have to comply when
utilized by the new branch.42 Given the emphasis the United States
already places on compliance with LOAC,43 such requirements will
not have any impacts on the development of a new force that are not
already placed upon military action.
2. BROADER TREATY FRAMEWORK
Several other international agreements involving space either
duplicate or expand upon key terms of the Outer Space Treaty.44
This additional international framework includes the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and
Under Water (“Limited Test Ban Treaty”);45 the Rescue and Return
Agreement;46 the Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (“Liability Convention”);47
the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space of 1975 (“Registration Convention”);48 and the Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies of 1979 (“Moon Agreement”).49 One other previously important treaty, the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti41

Id.
Id.
43
See DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL: JUNE 2015 ii (2016), https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/law-of-war-manual-june-2015.pdf (“The law of war is of
fundamental importance to the Armed Forces of the United States.”).
44
Ramey, supra note 5, at 73.
45
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
Limited Test Ban Treaty].
46
Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8.
47
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
48
Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan.
14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
49
G.A. Res. 34/68, Agreement on the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 5, 1979) [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
42
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Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972 (“ABM Treaty”),50 was rendered
void by the United States’ withdrawal in 2002.51
i. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty predates the Outer Space Treaty,52
the United States and Soviet Union having signed the Limited Test
Ban Treaty in 1963.53 The Limited Test Ban Treaty, like the Outer
Space Treaty, bans the use of nuclear weapons in space, although it
is more explicit regarding use and does not prevent signatory nations
from placing nuclear weapons in orbit.54 This creates a very similar
restriction on military employment of nuclear weapons in a spacebased conflict but does not restrict the use of nuclear weapons
dropped from orbit, unlike the Outer Space Treaty.55 Interestingly,
the Limited Test Ban Treaty may prevent the use of nuclear-fissionpowered space vehicles, as the Treaty bans any nuclear explosion in
space.56 More practically, the Limited Test Ban Treaty also disallows the use of nuclear weapons detonated in orbit to create an electromagnetic pulse effect, a tactic that could effectively disable enemy satellites.57
ii. The Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968
The Rescue and Return Agreement expands upon the Outer
Space Treaty’s requirement in Articles V and XIII that signatory nations will attempt to rescue and assist astronauts of other nations in
50
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
944 U.N.T.S. 13448 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
51
Fact Sheet: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, CTR. FOR ARMS CONTROL &
NON-PROLIFERATION (May 12, 2017), https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheetanti-ballistic-missile-treaty/; see also ABM Treaty Fact Sheet: Announcement of
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 13, 2001),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/200112132.html.
52
Compare Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45, with Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 3.
53
Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45.
54
Id. art. I.
55
Compare id., with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
56
Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45, art. I; see also Ramey, supra note
5, at 101.
57
Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45, art. I; see also Ramey, supra note
5, at 101.
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distress and return those astronauts to their home nation.58 The Rescue and Return Agreement requires that nations assist any foreign
astronauts “experiencing conditions of distress”59 and “safely and
promptly return[ ]” any personnel that land on a signatory nation’s
soil or are found by that signatory nation.60 At first glance, this
agreement seems to require an immediate return of any astronauts
captured as prisoners of war (“POWs”) should hostilities commence
in space. This may not be true, at least so long as the Outer Space
Treaty is in force—presuming the POWs are captured from the side
violating the Outer Space Treaty’s peaceful purposes clause by initiating hostilities.61 However, the Rescue and Return Agreement’s
requirement to return recovered astronauts “promptly”62 would bear
larger consideration if the United States were to withdraw from the
Outer Space Treaty and, in the future, military personnel conduct
physical operations beyond the bounds of Earth.
iii. The Liability Convention of 1972
The Liability Convention similarly expands upon an article of
the Outer Space Treaty, this time Article VII’s establishment of nations’ liability for damages caused by their “space objects.”63 The
Convention establishes a multi-tiered system of determining liability for damages.64 Interestingly, the Convention does not draw a distinction between military or civilian space objects or activities.65
Quite probably, then, the Liability Convention could subject a state
to pecuniary liability for military operations conducted from
space,66 although the likelihood of this affecting a decision to use
military force, when necessary, seems unlikely, as a successful belligerent would be able to impose its conditions for peace, and unsuccessful belligerents tend to owe reparations in some form post58

Compare Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8, art. II, with Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. V, XIII.
59
Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8, art. I.
60
Id. art. IV.
61
See Ramey, supra note 5, at 153.
62
Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV.
63
Compare Liability Convention, supra note 47, art. II, with Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 3, art. VII.
64
Liability Convention, supra note 47, arts. XIV–XVI.
65
See generally id.; see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 90.
66
Ramey, supra note 5, at 90.
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conflict.67 While international liability for space-based military activities would remain, then, after a withdrawal from the Outer Space
Treaty, the Liability Convention’s provisions seem unlikely to have
a significant impact on the Space Force.
iv. The Registration Convention of 1975
The Registration Convention establishes a system to record
basic functional and orbital information about each satellite placed
into Earth’s orbit.68 The Convention opens with a statement of dual
purpose: concerns of both national liability for space objects and the
peaceful use of space.69 The registration system itself, however, is
limited to very basic information about the satellite, requiring the
nation to identify its ownership as well as the launch location, orbital
information, and “general function of the space object.”70 The Convention does not define or give an example of a description of a satellite’s general function;71 this determination is instead left to the
state providing the information.72 The Registration Convention’s
impact on military operational security may not be as serious or detrimental as the Outer Space Treaty’s under Article XII, then, as the
United States could describe military satellites’ general functions
vaguely enough to prevent easy identification via the international
registry.73 Indeed, despite the registry’s existence, the use of satellites for military reconnaissance has hardly been hamstrung.74

67
See Reparations, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/reparations (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (defining “reparations” as
“a levy on a defeated country forcing it to pay some of the war costs of the winning
countries”).
68
Registration Convention, supra note 48, art. II.
69
Id. pmbl.
70
Id. art. IV.
71
Id.
72
Ramey, supra note 5, at 93. States have an affirmative duty to provide only
the following information to the international registry: name of launching state, a
designator or registration number for the space object, date and location of launch,
basic orbital information (nodal period, inclination, apogee, and perigee), and the
general function of the space object. Registration Convention, supra note 48, art.
IV.
73
Ramey, supra note 5, at 93.
74
Id. at 94.
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v. The Moon Agreement of 1979
Despite its name, the Moon Agreement extends its wording to
celestial bodies generally, much like the Outer Space Treaty.75 Like
the other agreements and conventions discussed above, the Moon
Agreement expands upon restrictions and requirements established
in the Outer Space Treaty; however, unlike the other treaties, the
United States is not currently a signatory nation.76 It allows the same
use of military forces on celestial bodies as the Outer Space
Treaty—peaceful purposes including scientific research—but elaborates on more distinct restrictions on the use of military capabilities
in space.77 The Agreement prohibits outright any “threat or use of
force or any other hostile act on the moon.”78 It also prohibits signatories from placing weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) in orbit
around any celestial bodies.79 Significantly, the agreement does not
prohibit the emplacement of other weapons around celestial bodies.80 Given that the Agreement essentially parrots the Outer Space
Treaty’s restrictions on military activities on celestial bodies, and
does little other than add additional wording to the Outer Space
Treaty’s requirement that any military activities be only for peaceful
purposes, the Moon Agreement does not add significantly to the
framework of international restrictions on Space Force capabilities.81 The Moon Agreement could have one potential complication
for future actions of the Space Force, which this Note will address
later in Parts III and IV. Should efforts materialize to colonize planetary bodies, the Moon Agreement presents the same host of issues
75

Compare Moon Agreement, supra note 49, art. I, with Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 3, art. I.
76
Compare Moon Agreement, supra note 49, with Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 3; DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1,
2019 546–47 (2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019TIF-Bilaterals-web-version.pdf (listing treaties and other international agreements the United States has signed regarding space, without presence of the Moon
Agreement); see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 98.
77
Compare Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV, with Moon Agreement,
supra note 49, art. II.
78
Moon Agreement, supra note 49, art. III.
79
Id.
80
See generally id.
81
See Ramey, supra note 5, at 96.
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for military enforcement of any laws, national or international, governing that colonization effort, and the United States should therefore avoid signing the Moon Agreement.
II. MODERN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND SPACE
This Part will address specific military capabilities that could
become a part of the Space Force and will evaluate their individual
legality under the Outer Space Treaty. First, it will focus on WMD
and whether orbital strike capabilities would fall within the Outer
Space Treaty’s restrictions on such capabilities. Second, it will evaluate the possibility of placing anti-ballistic missile defenses in orbit.
Third, it will analyze anti-satellite weaponry under the Outer Space
Treaty. Finally, it will discuss the Outer Space Treaty’s potential
impacts on human exploration and colonization of space.
A. Orbital Strike Capabilities
Current military technology can easily allow for the placement
of weapons on satellites in high- or low-earth orbit.82 The more difficult question is whether the placement and use of such weapons
would violate the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on satellites carrying WMD.83 Varying types of weapons will produce varying effects, and such effects must be considered in determining whether
or not a weapon is defined as a WMD.84 Some more futuristic technologies, such as directed energy weapons (“DEWs”) (colloquially
although inaccurately called lasers), could potentially raise concerns
regarding Article IV’s prohibitions on WMD, as well.85

82
David C. Hardesty, Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives, 58 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 45, 52 (2005).
83
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV; see also Hardesty, supra note
82, at 53 (discussing the Outer Space Treaty and stating, “it is difficult to distinguish space-based WMD from space-based non-WMD.”).
84
See Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–10.
85
Id. Vermeer determines that DEWs should not be considered WMD under
any traditional definition, even though some types employ atomic energy to function. Id. at 309–10. The question remains open and barely explored.
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1. DEFINING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Although the UN has not established a single, overarching definition of WMD, and the Outer Space Treaty itself does not define
the term, different bodies of the UN have established the term to be
as broad as “all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”86 or
“atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal
chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the
future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect.”87 These definitions leave undefined the full meaning of
“adaptable” or “comparable.” Arguments abound over exactly what
weapons satisfy international definitions.88 The United States takes
an even broader view of WMD, as the United States Code defines
the term to mean “any destructive device.”89 The term destructive
device is defined in a different section of the Code as “any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas.”90 Such a definition is substantially
broader than the UN definitions. The United States Code’s definition is likely not relevant to interpreting the Outer Space Treaty, as
it is directed at domestic prevention of terrorism,91 but it illustrates
just how generally the term can be interpreted. The ambiguity inherent in the definition of WMD leaves some uncertainty around employing weapons in space.92
2. ORBITAL STRIKE WEAPONS
Given the extensive nuclear capabilities of the United States military,93 basing nuclear weapons in orbit would not be worth the associated costs. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that
86
87
88

G.A. Res. 1(I), ¶ 5(c) (Jan. 24, 1946).
G.A. Res. 34/87 A (Dec. 11, 1979).
See, e.g., Hardesty, supra note 82, at 53; Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–

10.
89
90
91
92

18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)(a) (2018).
Id. § 921(a)(4)(a).
See id.
See, e.g., Hardesty, supra note 82, at 53; Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–

10.
93

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessment-us-military-power/us-nuclear-weapons-capability; Kingston Reif, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs,
ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Aug. 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization.
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simply modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal will cost 1.2 trillion
dollars.94 Given the cost of updating the current nuclear arsenal, basing nuclear weapons in space—the most obvious way to violate the
Outer Space Treaty—would not be worth whatever it would cost.
What space does offer, however, is the ability to conduct worldwide strikes of a more limited capability without the need to send
aircraft carriers around the world or establish forward air bases
abroad.95 Hypervelocity Rod Bundles, also known as “eroding rods”
or more colloquially as “Rods from God,” could strike targets across
the globe with a response time of one-and-a-half to two hours.96
These munitions, typically suggested to be a simple tungsten rod released from a satellite in high-earth orbit,97 could offer an explosive
yield comparable to their weight capable of destroying hardened targets like underground bunkers, missile silos, or reinforced aircraft
bunkers.98 Whether basing hypervelocity rods on satellites is lawful
under the Outer Space Treaty, however, is as unsettled as the definition of WMD.99 As the rods do not provide a nuclear, chemical, or
biological yield, they may not be considered traditional WMD;100
however, their immense destructive power could potentially run
afoul of broad UN definitions.101 Therefore, the Space Force’s ability to provide new strike capabilities with hypervelocity rods remains legally uncertain under the Outer Space Treaty.
Finally, and with the least legal controversy, the Space Force
could station and maintain conventional weapons on satellites in
low-earth orbit.102 Stationing conventional munitions similar to the
smart bombs carried by modern fighter aircraft in low-earth orbit
94

MICHAEL BENNETT, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, APPROACHES FOR MANAGING
COSTS OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES, 2017 TO 2046, at 3 (2017),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/presentation/53334-presentation.pdf.
95
See Hardesty, supra note 82, at 51–53.
96
Id. at 51–52; Colin Johnston, Rods from God: A Terrifying Space
Weapon?, ARMAGH OBSERVATORY & PLANETARIUM (Sep. 27, 2010),
http://www.armaghplanet.com/rods-from-god-a-terrifying-space-weapon.html.
97
Johnston, supra note 97.
98
Hardesty, supra note 82, at 51–53.
99
See id. at 53.
100
See Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–10 (discussing the legality of nuclear
weapons that lack the traditional characteristics of weapons termed WMD).
101
Id. at 308–09.
102
Hardesty, supra note 82, at 52.
THE
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would allow even more rapid employment than hypervelocity rods,
with a likely response time of twenty to thirty minutes.103 Because
placement of non-WMD in space does not explicitly violate the
Outer Space Treaty,104 this option would allow the Space Force to
easily provide a new strike option that the United States military
currently lacks, although more limited in capability than hypervelocity rods.
B. Anti-Ballistic Missile Defenses
The idea of basing anti-ballistic missile (“ABM”) weapons on
satellites to defend against nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic
missiles (“ICBMs”) first emerged in 1983, when President Reagan
proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (“SDI”).105 While the SDI
was nothing but an idea in the 1980s, derided by some opponents as
“Star Wars” for its suggestion of using lasers to shoot down Soviet
ICBMs,106 some of the concepts that once seemed like science fiction have inched closer to reality today. For example, the Air Force
suggested development of one such weapon, a functional ABM system called the Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement, or EAGLE, in a 2003 plan.107 One great concern of the plan,
which would use space-based mirrors to reflect a powerful groundbased laser beam at incoming missiles, was that adversaries would
be able to track the mirror satellites and either shoot them down or
launch ICBMs in the windows where the mirrors provided the least
coverage of launch points.108 The Outer Space Treaty does not ban
such satellites or require their outright disclosure, but the Registra-

103

Id.
Kuplic, supra note 19, at 1148.
105
Strategic
Defense
Initiative,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Strategic-Defense-Initiative (last visited Oct.
28, 2019).
106
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (Jul. 18,
2018), https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/strategic-defense-initiative-sdi.
107
Hardesty, supra note 82, at 46, 49–50. EAGLE’s legality (or the legality
of a similar modern system) vis-à-vis the Outer Space Treaty should not be a concern, as the beam emitter would be physically located on Earth. Of course, if a
plan called for stationing such an emitter on a satellite in orbit, concerns about the
weapon’s definition would again be pertinent.
108
Id.
104
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tion Convention does require the United States to identify such satellites’ basic purpose,109 leading to the concern that adversaries
could easily identify and defeat them. Regardless of the specific type
of ABM system developed, such systems are legal, if of limited
value under the Outer Space Treaty and other international agreements.
C. Anti-Satellite Warfare
Unlike the futuristic idea of mounting orbital strike weapons or
anti-ballistic missile defense on satellites, anti-satellite (“ASAT”)
warfare exists in the here and now.110 The United States first demonstrated the ability to hit a satellite with an air-launched missile in
1985.111 After a long pause in ASAT weapons testing, China demonstrated its own ability to hit satellites when it struck one of its aging
weather satellites with a ground-launched ballistic missile in
2007.112 The United States responded to the Chinese test in 2008 by
downing one of its own aging satellites with a ship-based missile.113
India struck one of its own aging military satellites with a groundlaunched missile, becoming only the fourth nation to test an ASAT
weapon in 2019.114 The Russian military is believed to be pursuing
a modern ASAT weapon system, as well.115

109
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV; Registration Convention, supra
note 48, art. I.
110
LAURA GREGO, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A HISTORY OF ANTISATELLITE PROGRAMS 1 (2012), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/201909/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf.
111
Id. at 5.
112
Id. at 13.
113
See id. at 12–13. India later joined the exclusive group of the United States,
Russia, and China in having tested functional ASAT missiles.
114
Ashlyn Still et al., India Shoots Down Own Satellite, REUTERS (Mar. 27,
2019)
https://graphics.reuters.com/INDIA-SATELLITEWEAPON/0100918Q1RV/index.html.
115
Leonard David, China, Russia Advancing Anti-Satellite Technology, US
Intelligence
Chief
Says,
SPACE.COM
(May
18,
2017),
https://www.space.com/36891-space-war-anti-satellite-weapon-development.html.
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The legality of ASAT weapons under the Outer Space Treaty is,
however, up for significant debate.116 This debate extends to the international arena, as Japan has condemned the Chinese ASAT test
in 2007 as illegal, while other countries merely condemned the Chinese action as irresponsible.117 Furthermore, the plain wording of
the Outer Space Treaty strongly suggests that ASATs are, if not prohibited, at least restricted in use under Article IX’s reporting requirements.118 These restrictions remain in place regardless of the method
used: even if nations resorted to non-kinetic ASAT weapons, such
as electronic jamming, the Outer Space Treaty’s implications remain.119
What may be currently allowed, however, are defensive ASATs:
the Outer Space Treaty focuses its prohibitions on activities interfering with “peaceful exploration and use.”120 Indeed, it seems to be
that nations do not forego the right to self-defense in space because
of the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibitions.121 Therefore, the Space
Force could, without implicating the Outer Space Treaty, employ
116
Compare Zedalis, supra note 19, at 481–82 (determining ASAT weapons
to be illegal under the Outer Space Treaty, while calling for further international
agreements clarifying the illegality of ASAT weapons), and Kuplic, supra note
19, at 1152–53 (confirming that international norms are trending towards nations
viewing ASAT weapons as illegal), with Esparza, supra note 5, at 355 (determining that kinetic ASAT weapons do not violate the Outer Space Treaty because
they are not specifically prohibited). While the debate about ASAT legality remains open, it appears to be weighted towards the view that ASATs are illegal
under the Outer Space Treaty.
117
Kuplic, supra note 19, at 1149–51.
118
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any
such activity or experiment.
Id. At a bare minimum, Article IX seems to require that states disclose the use of
an ASAT to any potentially affected nation prior to use of the weapon. Prior disclosure would prevent the effective viability of ASATs as a military tactic.
119
Esparza, supra note 5, at 351.
120
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
121
See, e.g., Esparza, supra note 5, at 356; Ramey, supra note 5, at 62–63.
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space-based defensive weapons meant to protect American satellites
from ASATs.122
D. General Military Activities
Until recently, the idea of establishing extraterrestrial colonies
seemed like science fiction, better suited to a Heinlein novel or a
blockbuster movie than a reality the international community would
need to address. While such an effort must still be some time in the
future, today some entrepreneurs tout plans to establish colonies on
Mars and make spaceflight commercially accessible.123 Even if talk
of extraterrestrial colonies is still uncommon, others see increasing
commercial opportunities beyond Earth.124 While the practical implications of such developments cannot be truly known before humanity reaches out into the heavens, the Outer Space Treaty has already established restrictions that could hamper such development:
primarily, the ban on military activities and installations on celestial
bodies.125 These possibilities remain far in the future, so new international agreements could rise to handle the problems space colonization could present. Currently, no nation could legally protect its
citizens on such colonies or handle any disputes that could arise because the Outer Space Treaty places a complete bar on the use of
military forces for any activities other than peaceful exploration or
scientific research.126
While faith in international agreements may lead to the belief
that military forces will not be needed beyond Earth, U.S. military
122

Because many proposed ASATs are in fact themselves satellites, these defensive weapons would also be considered ASATs. Esparza, supra note 5, at 349–
55. However, as Ramey notes, signatory nations are likely unable to avail themselves of the Outer Space Treaty’s protections once their space-based activities
imperil the safety of another nation’s legal satellites, and so therefore purely defensive ASATs should not violate the Outer Space Treaty, even when employed
to interfere with an aggressor ASAT. See Ramey, supra note 5, at 136.
123
See, e.g., Elon Musk, Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species, 5 NEW
SPACE 46, 46 (2017); Making Life Interplanetary, SPACEX,
https://www.spacex.com/mars (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter SpaceX
Mars Plan].
124
See, e.g., Our Mission, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/ourmission (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
125
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
126
Id.
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power has defined the period of relative peace and prosperity after
the Second World War, often referred to as the “Pax Americana.”127
This period of peace has been indisputably protected by American
military power.128 Should space colonization become a reality, some
power will need to fill the void created by new expansions. Whether
that power will be American, international, or another nation, the
Outer Space Treaty as it stands forbids the use of military personnel
to enforce peace beyond the Earth.129 Therefore, should such a duty
ever become a mission of the Space Force in the future, as far off as
it may be, the Outer Space Treaty will need to be discarded or reworked to avoid treaty violations.
III. THE SPACE FORCE
This Part will address the necessity of making the Space Force a
capable and functional military branch in its own right, rather than
an amalgamation of prior-existing agencies and units. First, it will
address the Pentagon’s current proposed plan, evaluating what portions could create potential conflicts with existing space law. Second, it will offer the potential national security solutions an unshackled Space Force could offer the United States.
A. Structure of the New Branch
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
(“NDAA”) establishes the Space Force as a component branch of
the Air Force.130 The NDAA authorized a Chief of Space Operations, a general officer who will report to the Secretary of the Air
Force and serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.131 The Space Force will
initially be composed of servicemembers drawn entirely from the

127
Pax Americana, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Pax%20Americana (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
128
Christopher Layne, The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-becameinevitable/256388/.
129
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
130
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 11692, §§ 951–61 (2019) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 908).
131
Id. §§ 952(b)(1), 953 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081(b)(1), 9082).
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active duty Air Force; the NDAA authorized no new military positions for the Space Force.132 The current Secretary of the Air Force,
Barbara Barret, plans to assign roughly 16,000 military servicemembers and civilian employees employed by Air Force Space Command to the new Space Force.133
The NDAA also establishes the Space Force’s official functions
and duties.134 The Space Force’s purpose is to provide “freedom of
operation for the United States in, from, and to space” and “prompt
and sustained space operations.”135 The Space Force is responsible
for (1) “protect[ing] the interests of the United States in space,” (2)
“deter[ring] aggression in, from, and to space,” and (3) “conduct[ing] space operations.”136
While the current plan for the Space Force provides no explicit
indication that the service would be pursuing new capabilities, its
voice on the Joint Chiefs of Staff should allow for visionary officers
to advocate for the new capabilities the Space Force can provide the
United States.137 The new service’s duties to provide freedom of op-

132

Id. § 952(d)(2) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 9081(d)(2)).
Rachel S. Cohen, Space Force Established as Trump Signs NDAA, AIR
FORCE MAGAZINE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.airforcemag.com/space-forceestablished-as-trump-signs-ndaa/.
134
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 §§ 952(c), (d) (to
be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081(c), (d)).
135
Id. § 952(c) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 9081(c)).
136
Id. § 952(d) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 9081(d)).
137
The Army officers who formed the Army Air Corps, later the Army Air
Service, Army Air Forces, and finally the independent Air Force advocated for
the radical changes in military structure and doctrine as air power evolved in the
early twentieth century. Army Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell, famously court-martialed for his zealous advocacy of airpower and an independent
Air Force, is often remembered as the most outspoken supporter of the radical
changes airpower wrought on twentieth-century combat. See Minnie L. Jones,
William “Billy” Mitchell – ‘The Father of the United States Air Force,’ U.S.
ARMY (Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.army.mil/article/33680/william_billy_mitchell_the_father_of_the_united_states_air_force. However, he was far from the
only military officer to do so. General of the Air Force Henry “Hap” Arnold, a
contemporary of General Mitchell’s known for his steadier hand in the development of the Air Force, played a more important, if less public, role in developing
airpower as an American military capability. See General Henry H. Arnold, U.S.
AIR
FORCE,
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/107811/general-henry-h-arnold/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). Given the military
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erations and deter enemy aggression in space suggest that the service’s needs for new capabilities will grow as human use of space
becomes more common. Given that many of the capabilities future
Space Force officers could advocate for are banned, restricted, or
hampered by the Outer Space Treaty, as discussed in Part II, supra,
and elaborated upon in Section III.B, infra, the United States should
reevaluate the current international legal framework regarding military activities in space.
B. Positive Impacts of Withdrawal
Withdrawing from the Outer Space Treaty would allow the
Space Force to pursue new strategic and tactical capabilities that
could drastically enhance the new branch’s contributions to national
security. The Space Force would immediately be able to pursue its
capabilities in orbit with less interference and greater operational security.138 It could station defensive ASATs around critical communications and reconnaissance satellites without having to disclose
exactly which satellites possessed defensive capabilities, thereby
making an adversary commit more resources before striking at
American satellites, or even preventing such potential attacks outright.139 Similarly, it could station ABM satellites in orbit without
having to disclose the exact nature of American missile defenses.140
Finally, it could emplace modern strike weaponry on satellites in
low-earth orbit, granting reaction times around the globe that aircraft
could never match, and again conceal the purpose of such satellites
from adversaries.141
With an eye to the future, the Space Force could develop more
unique and intensive strike options, such as hypervelocity rods, or
other technologies not yet conceived.142 It could develop an extensive and capable ASAT program able to remove adversaries’ space
capabilities space can offer, having an independent service head for the Space
Force seems likely to generate support for new ideas along the lines seen in the
Air Force’s own history.
138
See OPSEC MANUAL, supra note 30, at 12–14.
139
See supra Part II.C.
140
See supra Part II.B.
141
See supra Part II.A.
142
See supra Part II.A.
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capabilities in the event of serious conflict, all while protecting its
own satellites from interference.143 Furthest away, but bearing consideration, the service could develop plans to protect extraterrestrial
U.S. colonies or commercial interests as such ideas begin to edge
towards reality.144 These capabilities would take the Space Force
from being a mere recollection of sister-service units and turn it into
a truly fearsome and meaningful military branch in its own right. In
order to do so, the United States should consider withdrawal from
the Outer Space Treaty, with all its potential implications and benefits.
C. The Necessity of Space-Based Military Capabilities
The United States faces growing threats from multiple sources
to its interests in space.145 While Russia has not continued to grow
its military at its Cold-War level of development, it remains a capable threat to American satellites through kinetic and non-kinetic
ASAT weaponry.146 Other nations, such as Iran and North Korea,
have started pursuing space programs, albeit without truly significant investments or developments.147 Of greatest concern to the
United States, however, should be Chinese space-program developments.148 The Chinese continue to pursue advanced ASAT weaponry, both kinetic, like the country’s 2007 missile test, and nonkinetic (including electronic- and cyber-attack capabilities).149 Crucially, the Chinese have highlighted the strategic importance of
space in military publications and have created a military organization dedicated to space and cyber warfare.150
143

See supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., SpaceX Mars Plan, supra note 122.
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TODD HARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SPACE
THREAT ASSESSMENT 2018, at 1 (2018), https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment_FULL_WEB.pdf.
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Id. at 16–21.
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See id. at 6.
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Id. at 8–11.
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Id. at 7. The Chinese military branch dedicated to space falls under the
People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, and is called the Strategic Support Force, or
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limited, but China is clearly making space a priority in its military development.
Id. at 7–8.
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IV. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
This Part will address how the United States can, and whether
the United States should, withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty.
First, it will address the legal mechanisms behind enforcement of
international treaties and the Outer Space Treaty in particular. Second, it will cover the methods by which the United States could legally withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. Finally, it will conclude with the potential legal and geopolitical repercussions of
American withdrawal, with a final emphasis on the possibility of an
arms race in space.
A. Treaty Enforcement
Treaty enforcement as a cohesive idea in international law does
not truly exist.151 In reality, enforcement of most treaties requires
international attention and the imposition of sanctions on offending
nations.152 Alternately, some treaties include dispute resolution or
bilateral or multilateral enforcement mechanisms within their own
framework.153 In the absence of practical enforcement imposed by
treaties’ terms, states can take matters into their own hands, imposing sanctions unilaterally or engaging in other methods of selfhelp.154

151

Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1131, 1134–35 (2006).
152
Id. at 1135 (citing W. Michael Reisman, The Enforcement of International
Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1969)).
153
Id. at 1136–38. One of the more regularly recognized examples of this approach can be seen in the World Trade Organization, which can expel members
or impose trade sanctions for treaty violations. Id.
154
Id. at 1139–45. States can also enforce treaties on themselves under their
own domestic law, although such concerns are beyond the scope of this Article.
Whether or not the United States must automatically enforce ratified treaties as
codified domestic law remains an ongoing legal debate. Compare John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-SelfExecution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2218–20 (1999) (elaborating on why American courts should not automatically enforce treaties as domestic law), with Martin
S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and
Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2096–2100
(1999) (arguing treaties should be considered binding law on individuals within
American courts).
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The Outer Space Treaty itself contains no dispute resolution
method or enforcement mechanism.155 The treaty does provide that
signatories may “request consultation” with another party in certain
circumstances, although there is no requirement that the other party
agree to the request.156 In the event of another state’s violation of the
Outer Space Treaty, the only real recompense signatories have
would be the traditional methods of enforcement detailed above or,
in the most extreme case, a state’s traditional right to self-defense.157
None of this is to suggest the United States should violate the
Outer Space Treaty; rather, it is to recognize that the United States
(and any other signatory nation) has limited methods by which to
protect itself via the Outer Space Treaty should another state violate
its prohibitions or obligations.158 Indeed, given the treaty’s lack of
enforcement mechanisms and the serious impacts warfare in space
could have for American national security,159 the United States must
be ready to fight in space.160 The only way this can be done is to
actually prepare for the reality.161 Effective preparation requires two
things: a military force focused on and capable of fighting beyond
the lands, seas, or skies of Earth, which the Space Force can satisfy,
if properly equipped; and withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty.

155

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3; see also George D. Shrader, Defense in
Outer Space, 49 MIL. L. REV. 157, 158 (1970).
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Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX. Not only does Article IX contain
no requirement that the requested party agree to the consultation, the requesting
party must actually have a “reason to believe” that the other party’s actions could
be harmful in order to request the consultation. Id. Even then, the requested party
is under no obligation to accept. See id.
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See Shrader, supra note 155, at 159.
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Kuplic, supra note 19, at 1140–42; Schmitt, supra note 4, at 125.
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the
Moon,
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Announce,
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(Jan.
4,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/02/health/china-lunar-rover-far-moon-landingintl/index.html (last updated Jan. 4, 2019, 1:49 AM). The Chinese, notably, are
pursuing an active space program and have demonstrated the ability to reach targets in orbit. Id. While the United States should not focus its growth on a single
competitor, it must acknowledge the technological strides China has made in the
past several decades and accept that it will not be the only space-capable power
in the future.
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Hardesty, supra note 82, at 65–66; Schmitt, supra note 4, at 125.
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B. The Process of Withdrawal
In the United States, treaty withdrawal requires an analysis of
three elements: what type of agreement is at stake, whether international or domestic law will govern the withdrawal, and whether
Congress has enacted legislation to implement the agreement.162
The type of agreement determines the international and domestic requirements to achieve termination.163 Typically, in the case of treaty
withdrawals, requirements of both international and domestic law
must be considered in the United States.164 If Congress has enacted
enforcement legislation for a particular treaty, then only Congress
can repeal that legislation, regardless of whether the treaty behind
the legislation is still in force.165
Under international law, most treaties contain their own withdrawal provisions.166 The Outer Space Treaty contains a withdrawal
clause, which follows the international standard requiring a withdrawing party to give notice to the “Depositary Governments” (here,
the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom)167 one year prior
to the party’s intended effective withdrawal date.168 There are no
162

STEPHAN P. MULLIGAN, WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44761.pdf.
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Id. at 3.
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See id. at 2–3.
165
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Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/90th-congress/4/all-info (last visited
Dec. 29, 2019) [hereinafter All Congressional Information on the Outer Space
Treaty].
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other international legal repercussions for treaty withdrawal, although states that disapprove of another’s withdrawal may be able to
implement some international political or economic consequences.169
The domestic requirements for withdrawal from a Senate-approved treaty are more complicated and less settled than international requirements.170 The generally accepted understanding seems
to be that the President, as the head of the executive branch, has the
authority to withdraw from treaties because the executive is solely
responsible for “making official communications with foreign
states.”171 However, this is not settled law, and there remains debate
as to whether the Senate must also agree to treaty withdrawal. 172 If
Senate approval for withdrawal is required, then the same two-thirds
majority that the Constitution establishes for ratification would also
likely be necessary for the United States’ withdrawal.173
However, scholars seem to generally argue that treaty withdrawal is left entirely in the hands of the President.174 Executive
branch officials have almost universally argued the same.175 Congress as a whole has generally stepped back from involvement in
treaty termination since the start of the twentieth century, though
previously it had either authorized or retroactively approved presidential withdrawal from treaties.176 The courts have rarely had rea-
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son to step into treaty-making decisions or processes, but the Supreme Court did address a challenge by Congressional members to
an anticipated presidential treaty withdrawal in Goldwater v.
Carter.177 Although the Court split and delivered a plurality opinion,
the case was dismissed: the plurality found the issue to be a nonjusticiable political question,178 with one concurring justice instead
finding the issue at hand not ripe for review.179 Since Goldwater,
courts have more actively moved to dismiss such disputes between
the President and members of Congress as political questions.180
Therefore, the President can likely choose to withdraw unilaterally from the Outer Space Treaty, much like President Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.181 To satisfy
international law, notice must be given to the governments of Russia
and the United Kingdom one year prior to the United States’ effective withdrawal date.182 Because Congress has not enacted legislation enforcing the Outer Space Treaty’s restrictions on military activity, no domestic concerns will prevent treaty withdrawal from allowing the Space Force to move forward in pursuing new capabilities.183
C. Repercussions of Withdrawal
While the United States need not be concerned about legal repercussions of withdrawing from the Outer Space Treaty, there are
177
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practical concerns that must be taken into account. Other nations
could engage international organizations or simply act by themselves to place political pressure on the United States.184 Additionally, other nations could increase military focus on space, potentially
leading to a new arms race.185
1. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONCERNS
Two recent events surrounding high-profile arms-reduction treaties illuminate the likely responses to a U.S. withdrawal from the
Outer Space Treaty. The first is the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.186 The second is the U.S. withdrawal
from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (“INF”) Treaty, officially announced by President Trump on February 1, 2019.187 Both examples
suggest that withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty could bring
some international condemnation but little other action.
In 2002, against the advice of commentators and pundits in the
United States, President Bush withdrew from the ABM Treaty.188
International reaction to the move could be described as mild, at
worst: the Russians termed the American decision as “erroneous,”
but also indicated the decision “does not pose a threat to the national
security of the Russian Federation.”189 The Chinese stated opposition to an American ABM system but had no other reactions.190
Arms control organizations noted that the international reaction was
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“muted.”191 Domestically, President Bush’s move was met with
some criticism,192 including an unsuccessful lawsuit filed by some
members of Congress to prevent the treaty’s termination.193 Ultimately, the United States saw very few repercussions and very little
opposition to its move to terminate the treaty.194
The INF Treaty, established in 1987 between the United States
and the Soviet Union, banned “ground-launched” medium-range
missiles.195 For years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian
military had been accused by the United States and European nations of openly violating the INF Treaty by building up intermediate-range ballistic missiles (“IRBMs”).196 Although Russian violations were acknowledged at the UN, international pressure on Russia to regain compliance with the INF Treaty repeatedly came to
naught.197 In late 2017, following these repeated attempts to coax
the Russians back to compliance, the United States indicated that it
would consider withdrawing from the INF Treaty due to the Russian
violations.198 In 2019, after some review, the United States followed
through when President Trump announced the country’s pending
withdrawal.199
191

E.g., Wade Boese, U.S. Withdraws from ABM Treaty; Global Response
Muted, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, (July/Aug. 2002), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-07/news/us-withdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted.
192
See id.; Daalder & Lindsay, supra note 190.
193
Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002). As discussed supra
note 180, the suit failed on jurisdictional grounds.
194
Boese, supra note 191.
195
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles art. I, Dec. 8, 1987, 1657 U.N.T.S. 485 [hereinafter INF Treaty];
see also President Trump to Withdraw US from INF Treaty, supra note 187. Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles, or IRBMs, were defined as having a range
of 310 to 3,400 miles. INF Treaty, supra, art. II. The INF Treaty was initially
established to remove Soviet and American short- and medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, The
Intermediate-Range
Nuclear
Forces
Treaty,
DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/inf (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
196
Bureau of Arms Control, supra note 195; Steven Pifer, The Future of the
INF Treaty, BROOKINGS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-future-of-the-inf-treaty/.
197
Pifer, supra note 196.
198
Id.
199
President Trump to Withdraw US from INF Treaty, supra note 187.

594

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:563

International reaction to the INF Treaty withdrawal has been
somewhat less muted, although still hardly strong.200 The Russians
indicated that they would respond “accordingly.”201 European reaction has been understandably stronger, as Russian IRBMs would be
a threat to Europe, rather than to the United States.202 The North
American Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the European Union
(“EU”) restated their commitment to not employing IRBMs and indicated that they both saw greater security with the agreement than
without, although those comments made no mention of the fact that
Russia had already been openly violating the treaty.203 Some European nations indicated an interest in beginning discussions about a
new, more comprehensive arms control agreement to replace the ailing—indeed, now dead—INF Treaty.204 Domestically, reactions ran
much the same to withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: many political
and national security figures opposed withdrawal, but reactions
were not entirely one-sided, with some support for the President’s
decision.205
Withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty would encompass several differences from withdrawal from the ABM or INF Treaties.
First, significantly more nations are party to the Outer Space
Treaty.206 Second, the Outer Space Treaty covers more than just military technological developments and arms control: it also covers
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property rights issues and matters of exploration in space.207 Third,
the United States cannot claim that another primary signatory is repeatedly and flagrantly violating the treaty’s terms as reason to withdraw.208
However, these reasons alone need not stop the United States
from acting in its own, and indeed in its allies’, interests. Most of
the countries that are signatories to the Outer Space Treaty are not
physically capable of projecting force into space.209 While international organizations and other signatories may make official statements indicating disapproval with American withdrawal, such actions will not stand in the way of American objectives in withdrawing.210 Indeed, international disapproval with such a move could
also be a way to bring world leaders together to renegotiate an Outer
Space Treaty that allows the United States to defend its satellites
effectively, utilize space as necessary for military purposes, and address future human expansion into space in a more adequate manner,
all while maintaining restrictions on true WMD in space.211
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPACE-BASED ARMS RACE
The single greatest concern of any move to increase military activities and capabilities in space is the possibility of kick-starting a
new arms race.212 The UN has adopted regular resolutions aimed at
preventing a space-based arms race,213 although the United States
has typically abstained from such resolutions.214 Some commentators have called for a reevaluation of the Outer Space Treaty, or even
207
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a new, stronger treaty restricting military activity in and the weaponization of space.215
However, this concern has already developed beyond restriction
or prevention: current Chinese efforts are beginning to show that
space will be a likely next frontier in combat.216 China’s recent landing of an autonomous exploration vehicle on the dark side of the
Moon has distinctly military applications,217 and, after China’s willingness to continue development of ASAT weapons despite international condemnations of its 2007 test, the United States and the international community cannot ignore the probability that China will
be willing to fight in space.218 As the INF Treaty proved incapable
of preventing Russian development of IRBMs,219 so too will the
Outer Space Treaty prove incapable of preventing Chinese militarization of space, should China find such actions to be in its own best
interests.220 The United States ignores these developments at its own
peril: failure to act in space could leave it outmaneuvered by
China.221 Faith in Chinese compliance with the Outer Space Treaty
could lead to a devastating result for the United States and its allies
in a future war.222 While the United States’ withdrawal from the
Outer Space Treaty could directly lead to an outer space arms race,
such a conclusion would be preferable to Chinese military domination of the ultimate high ground.
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CONCLUSION
The muted international reactions to American withdrawal from
the ABM and INF Treaties show that the United States should not
let such concerns stand in the way of an effective Space Force. Withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty makes political and military
sense. The United States has a unique opportunity to develop a new
military focus on space as the Department of Defense establishes the
new Space Force. Without withdrawal from or violations of the
Outer Space Treaty, the Space Force will be unable to amount to
anything more significant than a restructuring of currently existing
capabilities and will do little to improve national security relative to
the costs of its creation. Should the United States withdraw, however, the Space Force can provide offensive and defensive military
capabilities that no other service can offer and ensure that the United
States is able to protect its interests in space as new adversaries, like
China, seek to claim the high ground over which the United States
has previously held a unique influence.

